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Legislative Response to In re
Ronald S.: Cal. A.B. 958
In 1976 the California legislature extensively amended the
state's juvenile justice laws.' While these amendments affected
the entire juvenile justice system, some of the most extensive
changes were to the laws relating to the "status offender."
In the context of juvenile law, "status offender" refers to a
juvenile who is deemed within the juvenile court's jurisdiction
due to his violation of laws exclusively applicable to minors, i.e.
curfew, truancy, etc.2 Since many of these laws are in terms of
the minor's condition or status, for example, "beyond the
control of his parents," the term "status offender" is used.
Prior to 1976, Welfare and Institution Code Section 601 pro-
vided that a minor could be brought within the juvenile court's
jurisdiction for:
(1) Refusing to obey the reasonable orders of his parents, guardian,
custodian, or school authorities;
(2) Being beyond the control of his parents, guardian, custodian, or
school authorities;
(3) Habitual truancy from school;
(4) Being in danger of leading an idle, dissolute, lewd, or immoral
life.3
Once within the juvenile court's jurisdiction for any of these
"offenses" the juvenile became a "ward of the court. ' 4 Wards of
the court under Section 601 were often referred to as "601's" or
"incorrigibles." An incorrigible was subject to essentially the
same disposition as a juvenile who was held within the juvenile
court's jurisdiction under Section 602 of the Welfare and Institu-
tions Code.5 Section 602 grants the juvenile courts jurisdiction
1. 1976 Cal. Stats. ch. 1071 at 4514.
2. See Arthur, Status Offenders Need Help Too, 26 Juv. JUST. 3 (1975).
3. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 601 (West 1972).
4. Id.
5. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 730 (West 1972) provided that a 601 could be
treated as a dependent child (i.e., one who's parents failed to provide for him) or
"as an additional alternative [the juvenile court] may commit the minor to a
juvenile home, ranch, camp, or forestry camp." CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 731
over minors who violate any law or ordinance of the state or its
political subdivision.6
California was not alone in treating incorrigibles essentially
as juvenile criminals. Today, in the majority of jurisdictions in
the United States, no attempt is made to distinguish the junior
felon from the chronic runaway. Most states simply include
"status offender" as another basis for finding the minor to be
delinquent.7 In 1961, California became the first state to recog-
nize a distinction between the non-criminal misbehavior of a
status offender and the criminal conduct of a delinquent. Prior
to 1961 the juvenile courts of California had jurisdiction under
Section 700 of the old Welfare and Institutions Code, which had
been enacted in 1937.8
Under the 1937 law a general grant of jurisdiction over minors
was conferred for a vast, diversified group of situations, in-
cluding:
(1) Begging in the streets;
(2) Being without adequate parental care;
(3) Destitution;
(4) Unfit home by reason of neglect, cruelty, or depravity of either
parent;
(5) Vagrancy or being in the company of criminals, vagrants, prosti-
tutes, or persons so reputed;
(6) Habitual visitation, without parental consent, to a public billiard
room, poolroom, or saloon;
(7) Habitual use of intoxicating liquors, cigarettes, opium, cocaine,
morphine, or other similar drugs;
(8) Persistant or habitual refusal to obey the reasonable and proper
orders or directions of his parents, guardians, or custodians; or who is
beyond the control of such person;
(9) Habitual truancy;
(10) Danger of leading an idle, lewd, or immoral life;
(11) Insanity;
(12) Violation of the laws of the state or its political subdivisions.9
Obviously, the legislature did not intend that each of these
situations should be considered analogous, but from the scheme
of the 1937 law, it is clear the legislature intended the juvenile
allows these same alternatives to wards of the court under Section 602. Section
731 additionally provided for commitment of 602's to the California Youth
Authority, which is essentially the agency responsible for maintaining Califor-
nia's most secure juvenile facilities.
The essential difference between the juvenile court's dispositional alterna-
tives in handling 601's and 602's was the requirement of an additional hearing
under CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 777 (West 1972) before a 601 could be committ-
ed to the Youth Authority; the 602 always being subject to placement with the
Youth Authority without the additional hearing.
6. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 602 (West 1972).
7. Gough, Standards Relating to Noncriminal Misbehavior, A. B. A. Juv.
JUST. STANDARDS PROJECT 3 (1977) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS].
8. See 1937 Cal. Stats. ch. 369 at 1030 § 700.
9. Id. at 1030 § 700(a)-(k).
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courts handle a variety of noncriminal, yet anti-social juvenile
behavior. The general grant of jurisdiction was followed by a
general dispositive scheme which essentially allowed the court
to use any facility or service regardless of the basis upon which
it acquired jurisdiction; the court's jurisdiction being the only
limitation,10 as well as the only basis, for differentiating the non-
criminal from the criminal.
With the 1961 amendments California began statutory differ-
entiation between the incorrigible and the delinquent. The dis-
tinction was in label alone; the law essentially allowed the court
to treat the incorrigible in the same manner as it treated the
criminal delinquent. Thus, the only benefit the 1961 changes
could realistically hope to produce was a lessening of the stigma
which attached to a non-criminal juvenile when he was adjudg-
ed to be a ward of the court under a general delinquency scheme
such as that promulgated under the 1937 law."
The 1976 amendments made the distinction between the incor-
rigible of Section 601 and the delinquent of Section 602 much
greater than that of labeling. Section 601 as amended provides
only three bases for finding a juvenile to be a ward of the court:
(1) Persistent or habitual refusal to obey the reasonable and proper
orders or directions of his parents, guardians, or custodian, or
(2) Being beyond the control of parents, guardians, or custodian, or
(3) Violation of a curfew applicable only to minors.12
Conspicuously absent from the new law was the old provision
allowing the court to take jurisdiction when the minor was in
"danger of leading an idle, dissolute, lewd or immoral life."
Truancy could also be a basis for 601 jurisdiction, but only in
limited situations. 13
More dramatic than the narrowing of 601 jurisdiction was the
statute's flat prohibition on placing a ward of the court under
Section 601 in any secured facility, 4 the first such prohibition in
10. See Article 7 of the 1937 law, [1937] Cal. Stats. ch. 369 at 1033.
11. Some commentators argue that even this minor benefit was not
achieved by the dual classification scheme. See Stiller & Elder, PINS: A
Concept in Need of Supervision, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 33 (1974).
12. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 601(a) (West Supp. 1977). The curfew viola-
tion had formerly been a basis upon which the minor could be held delinquent
under Section 602.
13. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 601(b) and 601.5 (West Supp. 1977).
14. The initial amendments to the juvenile laws placed the prohibition on
secured placement in Welfare & Institutions Code § 507 (see [1976] Cal. Stats. ch.
the country. This prohibition produced In re Ronald S. '5 Thir-
teen year old Ronald was adjudged to be a ward of the juvenile
court under the new Section 601. He was sent to a non-secure
crisis center under a court order to remain. He left the day he
arrived.
Ronald's conduct was not atypical. Since "the overwhelming
number of 601's are runaways,"'16 the fact they tend to flee the
non-secured facilities to which they are sent should surprise no
one. Hence, Justice Gardner wrote:
An immediate result of the 1976 amendment was that while the au-
thorities were doing the preliminary paperwork at the front door of a
non-secure home for a runaway, the runaway was simply running
away again out the back door. Placing a runaway in a non-secure
environment is something of an exercise in futility. 17
One aspect of Ronald's case was unusual. He had been placed
in the crisis center by Orange County's Juvenile Court Judge
Raymond Vincent. Judge Vincent, aware of the infirmities of
the new law, not only ordered 601's into the crisis centers, but
also ordered them to remain there. When the 601 did not remain,
a petition was filed alleging violation of Penal Code Section 166,
contempt of court.18 Thus, the 601 was transformed into a 602,
now subject to placement in a secured facility. Consequently,
when Ronald fled the non-secured crisis center, a contempt
petition was filed and found to be true. He was ordered to be
detained in the secure juvenile hall. By writ of habeas corpus, he
contested the juvenile court's finding him within its jurisdiction
under Section 602.
Justice Gardner sympathized with the plight of Judge Vin-
cent, but held the new law was designed to avoid the very type of
bootstrapping in which the Judge had engaged. 19 One of the
most frequent complaints about the pre-1976 law was the ease
"with which a 601 could become a 602 and conceivably end up in
1071 at 4519). The cleanup bill which followed the amendments now calls for the
placement of the prohibition in Welfare & Institutions Code § 207(b). (See [1977]
Cal. Stats. ch. 910 at 2697). Section 207(b) will read: "[N]o minor shall be detained
in any jail, lockup juvenile hall, or other secure facility, who is taken into
custody solely upon the ground that he is a person described in Section 601 or
adjudged to be such or made a ward of the juvenile court solely upon that
ground. If any such minor is detained, he shall be detained in a sheltered care
facility or crisis resolution home as provided for in Section 654, or in a non-
secured facility provided for in subdivision (a), (b), (c), or (d) of Section 727."
15. 69 Cal. App. 3d 866, 138 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1976).
16. Id. at 872, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
17. Id.
18. CAL. PENAL CODE § 166 (West 1972).
19. 69 Cal. App. 3d at 874, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 392.
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the CYA [California Youth Authority]. 2 ° Continuing, Justice
Gardner wrote:
The procedure went something like this: All dispositions available for
a 602 were available for a 601 except one-commitment to the Youth
Authority. This was reserved for the 602's. However, it was quite
simple for a 601 to become a 602 because one of the grounds for
becoming a 602 was that after having been declared a 601 the juvenile
failed to obey a lawful order of the juvenile court. Thus, without
breaking any law, a 601 could, by simply walking out of a foster home,
become a 602, and eventually be well on his way to the CYA [Califor-
nia Youth Authority]. 2'
The 1976 deletion from Section 602 of the proviso which al-
lowed the juvenile court to elevate a 601 to a 602 when he vio-
lated a court order was clear evidence of a legislative intent not
to allow the contempt type bootstrapping Judge Vincent em-
ployed.22 In granting the writ of habeas corpus Justice Gard-
ner stated:
While it may seem ridiculous to place a runaway in a non-secure
setting, nevertheless, that is what the Legislature has ordered. The
Legislature has determined that 601's shall not be detained in or
committed to secure institutions even if this makes juvenile court
judges look ridiculous. The procedures established by Judge Vincent
clearly are an inappropriate basis for a Section 602 petition. If they
were, a deletion of language in Section 602 would become meaningless
and we would simply revert to the bootstrapping operation again. The
court would be doing by indirection that which cannot be done direct-
ly. As the law now stands, the Legislature has said that if a 601 wants
to run, let him run. While this may be maddening, baffling and annoy-
ing to the juvenile court judge, ours is not to question the wisdon of the
Legislature. 23
20. Id. at 870-71, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
21. Id. at 871, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
As noted in note 5 supra, it was possible, under limited circumstances, for a
601 to be committed to the Youth Authority without elevation to a 602 status.
Hence, the statement that Youth Authority commitment was exclusive to 602's is
not entirely correct.
In 1975 the California Youth Authority, believing placement of non-criminal
status offenders together with criminal delinquents was counter productive,
refused to accept non-criminal offenders into its facilities. Thus, discussion of
the status offender's exposure to Youth Authority commitment is valid only in
terms of "possibilities under the law." In reality, such dispositions were barred
in 1975. See DEPT. OF THE YOUTH AUTHORITY, REPORT TO THE INSTITUTE FOR
JUVENILE COURT JUDGES AND REFEREES (March 1976).
22. Prior to 1976, Section 601 set two basis upon which a minor could come
within the court's jurisdiction: (1) violations of law defining a crime; (2) failure to
obey an order of the juvenile court.
The 1976 amendment makes only the first of these violations of law, a basis for
finding jurisdiction under CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 602 (West Supp. 1977).
23. 69 Cal. App. 3d at 873-74, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 392.
In Re Ronald S.: Cal. A.B. 958[Vol. 5: 847, 1978]
While the Justice was unwilling to question the wisdom of the
Legislature, he felt a "responsibility to address [himself] to the
subject of possible legislative reaction." He stated:
It appears to us that the Legislature must make a clear-cut decision in
this field. We have no suggestions as to just what that decision should
be but point out that the field apparently'is limited to three alterna-
tives.
First, the Legislature can decide that 601's are no business of the state
and step out of the field entirely. This could be done on the basis that
parent and child relationships are no concern of the state and in the
case of an alleged incorrigible, parent and child are simply going to
have to work out their problem without state help or intervention. A
necessary corollary to this would be that if a youngster wants to run
away from home, that is his business.
Second, the Legislature can decide that state intervention is desirable
in these matters, remove the section 601 problem from the courts and
place it in some other governmental agency which does not have the
coercive power of a court. Thus, the state could provide facilities to
which runaways would come voluntarily-where shelter, food, med-
ical care, advice and counsel could be obtained. In other words, the
state would maintain youth hostels with counseling services. How-
ever, once the state determines to do this, the juvenile court should be
out of the picture because, as we will explain, it is intolerable to expect
a court to administer such a program.
Third, if the Legislature determines that 601's are to remain under the
protection of the juvenile court, section 507 must be amended to pro-
vide that in the proper case, a runaway may be detained in a secure
setting. This could be done without the old procedure by which the
minor could leapfrog into section 602 status. It could also be done
without placing the minor in contact with 602's, simply by providing
that in some instances a sheltered-care facility or crisis center be a
secure establishment. If the juvenile court is to be saddled with the
responsibility for 601's, it must also be afforded the tools and au-
thorities to handle those cases. Courts must have coercive authority
or they cease being courts. A judge does not suggest to a defendant
that he go to prison, he sentences him to prison. A judge does not ask a
parent to support his child, he orders him to do so. When a judge gives
a money judgment, or other relief to a litigant, procedures exist for the
enforcement of that judgment. It is simply not fair to a juvenile court
judge to whom the community looks for help to so restrict him that
he cannot put his orders or decisions into effect. Certainly not all
601's need to be placed in secure facilities. However, some do and in
these cases the juvenile court judge must have the authority to detain
in a secure facility-if 601's are to remain in the juvenile court.24
(emphasis added).
At the present time the Legislature has not reacted; however,
Assembly Bill 958 is now in committee as a proposed solution to
the problems raised by In re Ronald S. 25
Assembly Bill 958 would amend Section 207 of the Welfare
and Institutions Code. In particular the Bill would:
(1) Permit secured detention for twelve hours to determine if there
are any outstanding warrants against the juvenile;
(2) Allow twenty-four hour detention to locate parents or guardian
24. Id. at 874-75, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 392-93.
25. Cal. A.B. 958 (1977). Text of the Bill is in Appendix 1.
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(forty-eight hours if parents reside in another county than that where
the minor was taken into custody);
(3) Provide for secured detention until a hearing if the juvenile has
failed to appear at a hearing after having received notice;
(4) Allow secured detention when the minor has fled a non-secure
facility when he was sent under court order;
(5) Permit a probation officer to detain the minor if he has rea-
sonable cause to believe the minor is a substantial danger to himself
because of drug or alcohol related problems, medical problems, or is
potentially suicidal. 26
The Bill would also prohibit any contact between minors held
under its provisions and minors taken into custody under Sec-
tion 602.27
The amendment does provide a remedy for situations similar
to Ronald's. The real question is whether the remedy provided is
a solution to both the practical problems of the juvenile court
judge as well as the more esoteric problems which the Legisla-
ture attempted to address with the 1976 amendments. On both
of these issues the amendment falls short.
In terms of the practical problems of the juvenile court, the
judge, at least initially, is still in the position of "suggesting to a
defendant that he go to prison." Only when its orders are de-
fined can the court use its coercive power. Justice Gardner
commented that: "Courts must have coercive authority or they
cease being courts.' 28 If this is true, the amendment effectively
requires the juvenile courtto act in a "non-court" capacity in its
initial meeting with the 601 offender. "It is widely conceded that
unruly child cases are usually the most intractable and difficult
matters with which the juvenile court has to deal; perhaps this is
in part so precisely because the court is not the place to deal
with them. '29 It is difficult to believe that the conversion of the
juvenile court into a "non-court" by the denial of coercive pow-
ers will make them any more effective in dealing with the incor-
rigible.
Consequently, the amendment will still make the juvenile
court judge initially appear ridiculous without any benefit to the
juvenile. To avoid this result, the amendment should be chang-
ed. Two possible solutions are suggested.
26. Cal. A.B. 958 § 207(c) (l)-(5) (1977).
27. Cal. A.B. 958 § 207(d) (1977).
28. 69 Cal. App. 3d at 875, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 393.
29. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at 4.
First, the Legislature could grant the court the right to con-
sider all relevant factors in the juvenile's background and then
decide whether to place the juvenile in a secured facility at the
initial hearing. Similar "risk" decisions are made daily in the
criminal courts when a defendant moves for release on his own
recognizance. The obvious risk of such a system is the probable
conservatism the court would use in granting non-secured dis-
positions.
In the alternative, the legislature could decide that coercive
courts are indeed not the place to initially treat the incorrigible.
Rather than file a petition with an emasculated juvenile court, a
petition on referral to an appropriate social agency would be the
initial state involvement with the incorrigible. Only when this
failed should the court become involved. A similar solution was
proposed by the United States Department of Justice's Adviso-
ry Committee on Standards for the Administration of Juvenile
Justice.30 Such a proposal has much to offer. It would free a
great deal of judicial time and facilities. While exact figures are
unavailable, it has been estimated that twenty-five to thirty per-
cent of the cases filed in juvenile court are based on status
offenses. Over half of these status offenders now spend time in
secured facilities and twenty-five percent of those adjudicated
are sent to juvenile institutions. 3 1 This savings of time and
facilities would result in some cost savings; however, the in-
creased cost of social service would probably negate any real
economic savings.
The proposal would also restore the stature of the juvenile
court. When brought before the court, the juvenile would face
the full coercive power of the state after it had been determined
non-coercive methods were not helpful. In this position, the
court can compel the respect of the juvenile.
Finally, the proposal would help the juvenile. Traditional
methods of status offense jurisdiction simply do not work. The
California Assembly Interim Committee on Criminal Proce-
dure found no evidence to suggest that status offense juris-
diction has been effective in either controlling the incorrigible
or affecting his behavior as an adult. 32
30. See REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE ADMINISTRATOR ON
STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE,
LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADM. 10 (1975) wherein it was recommended,
"The Family Court should not exercise its jurisdiction over non-criminal misbe-
havior unless all available and appropriate noncoercive alternatives to assist the
juvenile and his or her family have been exhausted."
31. Id. at 11.
32. See A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF STANDARDS AND STATE PRACTICES
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When faced with these findings it seems irresponsible to adopt
legislation which would revive or prolong the unworkable situa-
tion which has existed and continues to exist today. If the state
has the right to involve itself with non-criminal misbehavior of
the juvenile, both the public and the juvenile have a right to
expect such involvement will be effective.
California began "low profile" judicial involvement with
status offenders in 1976. In re Ronald S. opens the door to
graceful judicial withdrawal from the initial care of status of-
fenders.
RICHARD E. BOEHM




The people of the State of California do enact as follows:
SECTION 1. Section 207 of the Welfare and Institutions
Code is amended to read:
207. (a) No court, judge, referee, or peace officer shall
knowingly detain in any jail or lockup any person under the age
of 18 years, unless a judge of the juvenile court shall determine
that there are no other proper and adequate facilities for the
care and detention of such person, or unless such person has
been transferred by the juvenile court to another court for pro-
ceedings not under the juvenile court law and has been charged
with or convicted of a felony. If any person under the age of 18
years is transferred by the juvenile court to another court and is
charged with or convicted of a felony as herein provided and is
not released pending hearing, such person may be committed to
the care and custody of a sheriff, constable, or other peace
officer who shall keep such person in the juvenile hall or in such
other suitable place as such latter court may direct, provided
that no such person shall be detained in or committed to any
hospital except for medical or other remedial care and treat-
ment or observation.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision (a), no
minor shall be detained in any jail, lockup, juvenile hall, or
other secure facility who is taken into custody solely upon the
ground that he is a person described in Section 601 or adjudged
to be such or made a ward of the juvenile court solely upon that
ground, except as provided in subdivision (c). If any such minor,
other than a minor described in subdivision (c), is detained, he
shall be detained in a sheltered-care facility or crisis resolution
home as provided for in Section 654, or in a nonsecure facility
provided for in subdivision (a), (b), (c), or (d) of Section 727.
(c) A minor taken into custody upon the ground that he is a
person described in Section 601, or adjudged to be a ward of the
juvenile court solely upon that ground, may be held in a secure
feei4ity facility, other than a facility in which adults are held in
secure custody, in any of the following circumstances:
(1) For up to 12 hours after having been taken into custody
for the purpose of determining if there are any outstanding
wants, warrants, or hold against the minor.
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(2) For up to 24 hours after having been taken into custody,
excluding weekends and court holidays, in order to locate the
minor's parent or guardian as soon as possible and to arrange
the return of the minor to his parent or guardian, whose parent
or guardian is a resident of the county wherein the minor was
taken into custody.
(3) For up to 48 hours after having been taken into custody,
excluding weekends and court holidays, in order to locate the
minor's parent or guardian as soon as. possible and to arrange
the return of the minor to his parent or-guardian, whose parent
or guardian is a resident outside of the county wherein the
minor was taken into custody.
(4) Until a detention hearing on a petition alleging that such a
minor is a person described in Section 601, and who is not
presently a ward of the court under Section 601, if the minor has
failed to appear for any hearing on the petition after having
received notice thereof.
(5) Until the minor is otherwise placed pursuant to a court
order, if there is reasonable cause to believe that the minor has
fled a sheltered-care facility, crisis resolution home, or nonse-
cure facility in violation of a court order.
The matter shall be continued to a specific future date not
more than 15 days after the date of the order detaining the
minor in a secure facility. The continued hearing shall be placed
on the appearance calendar and the probation officer shall file a
supplemental report as to his efforts to place the minor in a
nonsecure facility. If the minor has not been placed in a nonse-
cure facility within 15 days of the order detaining him in a
secure facility, the matter shall be placed on the appearance
calendar every 15 days thereafter until the minor is placed in a
nonsecure facility. No minor shall be detained under this provi-
sion for more than 45 days after the date of the order of disposi-
tion of such minor.
(6) Until a detention hearing, if the probation officer has
reasonable cause to believe that the minor is a substantial dan-
ger to himself because of drug or alcohol related problems,
medical problems, or is potentially suicidal. A detention pur-
suant to this paragraph shall be at an appropriate medical or
mental health facility when available.
(7) Ntwithetanding any other prvisien of thi ehaptre b
the pourt deter-mine by a prependeranee of evidennc that a
miner deseribed in paragraph (6) is a danger to himslf due to
one or more f the reasons stated therin and ueh ure deten
tien shall be for the purpose of treating the conditien whieh
resulted int the miner being plaeed in seeture detentien at a
mdip or mental ho elhth facility for suh purpose.
(7) If, at the detention hearing, the court determines by a
preponderance of the evidence that a minor described in para-
graph (6) is a substantial danger to himself due to one or more
of the reasons stated therein, the minor may be detained in an
appropriate medical or mental health facility for the purposes
of treating the minor's condition.
The matter shall be continued to a specific future date not
more than 30 days after the date of the order adjudging the
minor to be a ward of the court under Section 601. Upon a
showing of good cause, the matter may be continued for no
more than 30 days after the initial 30-day period has expired.
The probation officer shall make an investigation, file a supple-
mental report, and make his recommendation for disposition
and state the necessity for continued secure detention. Unless
the minor has been released from secure detention, the
continued hearing shall be placed on the appearance ealenda.
During the time the minor is dctaincd in a securo facility, the
probation officor shall file a nonappearanec proegress report
with the cour. t vr y 20 days.calendar.
The court shall advise all persons present at the disposition
hearing of the date of the future hearing and of their right to be
present, to be represented by counsel and to show cause, if they
have cause, why the jurisdiction of the court- vr ehe minor
should bo terminated. Notiee of hearing shall be mailed by the
probation officr. to the same pero innoiginal pr d
ing and to ounorl of reird by eitified mail addressed to the
last known addrc33s of the peiroon to be noetified, oir shall be
personally se~yed on sueh pcroon3, not earlier than 20 days-
preeeeding the date to whieh the heain -a contiatied minor
should not be released from secure detention.
(d) Any minor detained in a seeure facility juvenile hall pur-
suant to subdivision (c) may not be permitted to come or remain
in contact with any person detained in such secuefac lity on
the basis that he has been taken into custody upon the ground
that he is a person described in Section 602 or adjudged to be
such or made a ward of the juvenile court upon that ground.
[Vol. 5: 847, 1978] In Re Ronald S.: Cal. A.B. 958
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Minors detained in juvenile hall pursuant to Sections 601 and
602 may be held in the same facility provided they are not
permitted to come or remain in contact within that facility.
(e) Every county shall keep a record of each minor detained
under subdivision (c), the place and length of time of such deten-
tion, and the reasons why such detention was necessary. Every
county shall report, on a monthly basis, this information to the
Department of the Youth Authority, on forms to be provided by
that agency.
The Youth Authority shall not disclose the name of the de-
tainee, or any personally identifying information contained in
reports sent to the Youth Authority under this subdivision.
SEC. 2. Section 507 of the Welfare and Institutions Code is
repealed.
SEC. 3. The sum of - dollars ($ ---- )eight
million seven hundred thousand dollars ($8,700,000) is hereby
appropriated from the General Fund to the State Controller for
allocation and disbursement to local agencies pursuant to Sec-
tion 2231 of the Revenue and Taxation Code to reimburse such
agencies for costs incurred by them pursuant to this act.
No allocation or disbursement, or both, may be made for
capital expenditures incurred under subdivision (d) of Section
207 of the Welfare and Institutions Code until the necessity for
such expenditure is approved by the Department of the Youth
Authority. The Department of the Youth Authority shall re-
view all requests from counties for modification of existing
facilities, the construction of new facilities, and the need for
additional beds, pursuant to subdivision (d) of Section 207 of
the Welfare and Institutions Code for purposes of determining
the number of additional beds, if any, necessary to comply with
this section; and the reasonably necessary costs, if any, for
modification or construction of such facilities. A county shall
have the final authority with regard to the location of such
modification or new facilities. In the event the county disag-
rees with the final decision of the Department of the Youth
Authority, the county may request review by the Board of
Corrections, and the Board of Corrections shall have final
authority in such review.
SEC. 4. By adding paragraphs (4) to (7), inclusive, to sub-
division (c) of Section 207 of the Welfare and Institutions Code
at the 1977-78 Regular Session of the Legislature, the Legisla-
ture intends to establish the statutory jurisdictional basis, sep-
arate and apart from Section 601 of such code, for the secure
detention of minors under the limited circumstances set forth
therein. The purpose of such statutory jurisdictional basis for
detention is to provide the court and other authorities with
alternatives for responding to circumstances created by the
actions of a minor that are, to the extent appropriate, compara-
ble to alternatives for responding to like circumstances
created by the actions of an adult.
-& G.4.SEC. 5. This act is an urgency statute necessary for
the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety
within the meaning of Article IV of the Constitution and shall go
into immediate effect. The facts constituting such necessity are:
In order to clarify the extensive changes made in the juvenile
court law at the 1976 Regular Session of the Legislature, it is
imperative that this act go into immediate effect.
